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ABSTRACT

This Thesis examines Telecommunications Industry
efficiencies in the face of recent regulatory reforms.
Regulation was believed to be required because of the
telecommunications industry's apparent natural monopoly.
The promise of regulation was to act as a surrogate to
competition in controlling the monopolist.

Regulation

should require the monopolist to operate as close to a
competitive marginal cost as possible.

With effective

regulation, the consumer would then expect to be paying as
low a price as possible for the service provided by the
regulated monopolist.
Aside from commendable technological and systems
improvements by the telephone companies, no significant
improvement in operating efficiency would be expected with
rate of return regulation reform.
Included in this discussion of telecommunication
industry regulation is an event analysis of the trend of the
employee per access line efficiency correlated with the
announcement of regulatory reforms.
relationship is demonstrated.

A significant
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Considerable debate has been raging over the
telecommunications policy for the United States.
significant issues are in the forefront.

Three

They include

cross-subsidies, technological change, and regulation
reform.
Since the deregulation of the long distance market took
place in 1984, significant technological change has
continued in the industry.

Additional market niches of the

telecommunications industry are exposed to competitive
entry.
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted a
pro-competitive stance permitting competitive exploitation
of those market niches.

Regulatory reform has been

suggested to enable the industry to react to the
evolutionary changes.

This reform contains built-in

incentives to encourage the regulated monopolist to react to
the changing environment.

Incentives attempt to simulate a

competitive environment for the telecommunications manager.
The promise of one regulated firm delivering all
telecommunication services had a certain amount of appeal
for the Progressive movement of the early 1900's.
1

One firm

2

should deliver telephone services for the least cost.

With

the recent competitive challenges in this industry, it is
not clear that regulation has maintained the least cost
across all services.

Where there are examples of prices

higher than competitive prices, cream skimming has continued
through out the telecommunications industry.
The issue of real cost of service has been an ever
pervasive problem.

While there is evidence of competition

in various sectors of the telecommunications industry, there
is still a strong contention that the residential
telecommunications market is a natural monopoly.

Because of

the economies of scale, it is unlikely that competition
would be available to provide a market control mechanism for
pricing in the residential sector.
As technology has continued to develop, the medium no
longer restricts the provision of telecommunication
services.

Copper cable technology, as the only alternative

for delivering telecommunication services, is now being
replaced with fiber, wireless and coax technologies.

These

technologies are owned and utilized by other than
telecommunications companies.
In recent years, the cable television industry has
penetrated a significant portion of the marketplace in this
country with their television services.

Because of their

fiber optic and coax networks, an alternative path for

3

delivery of residential telecommunication services now
exists.
Additionally, cellular wireless telecommunication
services have enjoyed a significant boom in recent years.
Cellular wireless has achieved significant penetration in
all the major markets in this country.
These additional delivery mechanisms for
telecommunication services now available, notably the
development of fiber optics, has also provided additional
avenues for delivery of services.

The placing of conduit

systems and access ways to the customer is a crucial cost
item for telecommunications.

Existing infrastructures for

other utilities have now, because of fiber optic technology,
become a candidate for supporting the delivery of
telecommunication services.
Because of the unobtrusive nature of fiber optics,
fiber optic cables can be placed in power easements, gas
easements and conduit systems without conflict.

This opens

up additional pathways for the delivery of telecommunication
services.

With this turn of events, it is doubtful that

even the residential telecommunications market can remain a
natural monopoly.

The residential market, because of

economies of scale, is considered the last possibility for
competitive activity for telephone service.
Regulatory reform and price cap alternatives have been
suggested as mechanisms, whereby responsible pricing can be

4

affected to all users of the telecommunication industry.
The recently enacted FCC Price Cap Policy allows a telephone
company to earn more than the allowed rate of return for
interstate jurisdiction services, provided that it agrees to
a maximum pricing constraint.

Determining actual costs for

the provision of services is one of the bigger problems of
regulation.

The complexity of both the technologies and the

services provided in the telecommunications industry, have
contributed to the problems for regulation.
In the midst of these trying times, a study of the
behavior of telephone industry management would be helpful
for policy makers.
changes?

Does management react to regulatory

To assess that, I analyzed the output efficiency

of the telecommunications industry.

One might suspect that

technology and improved systems of operations make
improvements in output efficiency.

If, however,

improvements are demonstrated because of changes in
regulatory policy, and not explainable by changes in
technology, another improvement possibility exists.

The

other possibility could be that certain management
discretion exists in the present structure that has not been
optimized by the regulatory system.

This management

discretion would be the issue that rate of return regulation
has been unable to address and the reason to investigate
alternatives.

5

The rate of growth of output efficiencies was analyzed
to provide evidence of efficiencies not adopted by telephone
management until regulatory reforms are initiated.

A timing

correlation of efficiency improvements, with those periods
of important rate regulation reform, supports the hypothesis
here.

CHAPTER 2
LITERARY REVIEW
I direct your attention to my study entitled "Literary
Review on the Subject of Economic Regulation of the
Telecommunication Industry", dated May, 1993.

Supportive

information, appropriate to the issues of this study is
cited.
The literary review has been categorized into several
sections that are noteworthy for our purposes.
The first section discusses the theory of monopoly and
natural monopoly.

The cost function of a natural monopoly

is everywhere subadditive.

More clearly stated, costs are

subadditive if a monopoly firm can produce a given output at
a lower cost than what two or more firms can.1 This would
provide a basis for the belief that a natural monopoly
telephone firm would have the lowest cost for its services.
The prices for services of the telephone company would be
sustainable based on its cost level.
Because of the complexity of the services provided in
the telecommunications industry, an important issue in price
sustainability has been that of rate design.

Telephone

^W. W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly.. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 83.
6

companies provide multiple services using the same
investment.

A problem exists assigning the proper pricing

of individual services with regard to the common cost and
common facilities used to deliver all of the services.
Rate designs have been recommended by the industry that
are based on the inverse elasticity rule or Ramsey Pricing.
This discriminatory pricing plan would charge more profit
margin on services with the low elasticity, e.g., basic
services, and less profit margin on services with high
elasticity, e.g. competitive services.

This plan would

provide the best basis for defense against competitive entry
into the industry.2
Discriminatory pricing, or pricing of the same service
at different rates for different customers, has never been
politically popular in the regulation of telecommunications.
Politically acceptable pricing of services has been a
problem and a major contributor to unsustainability of many
monopoly services.

Subsidies for inelastic services such as

basic residential services, have been provided from more
elastic services such as long distance and business
services.

The pricing levels for subsidizing services

created margins attracting competitive entry.

For these

unsustainable monopoly services, competition has the power
2William J. Baumol et al., Contestable Markets and The
Theory of Industry Structure (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1982), 224.

s
to provide the required constraints.

Competition, however,

would not provide all the answers for pricing consistent
with the political agendas.3

Rate design is an important

matter facing the telephone industry.
The second section of the literary review continues
with a discussion of the regulatory history.

The

Progressive movement's influence on regulation in this
country, dating back to the early 1900's, has been very
strong.

It is important to understand that the business

interest of the business leaders at the time, were just as
influential in establishing regulation of certain industries
as

the motivation to protect the basic consumer.4

Then, as

well as now, businesses are interested in the benefits of
regulation for their interests.
Regulatory constraint is covered in the Regulatory
Policy section of the literary review.

How to act as a

proper competitive surrogate for the constraint of the
monopolist, became the question.
Rate of return regulation was selected as the most
viable vehicle for constraining the monopolist's activity in
the telephone industry5.

Rate of return regulation,

3Baumol, 349.
4Otis L. Graham, Jr. The Great Campaigns: Reform and War in
America. 1900-1928. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971),
16.
5Michael A. Crew,
The Economics of Public Utility
Regulation. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 93-96.

however, showed significant shortcomings.

Shortcomings are

shown in the incentive to inflate the rate base and the lack
of motivation to operate in the most efficient manner.6
In regulating the telecommunications industry, there
are five major products that are addressed:
2)local usage
distance access

1)local access

3)inter-lata long distance services
5)special services.

4)long

The country was

divided into regions for the purposes of differentiating
long distance jurisdictions from local jurisdictions.

This

was accomplished with the deregulation of the long distance
services.

The regions were termed Local Areas of Transport

Access, i.e. LATA.

The FCC restricts the local exchange

companies from providing inter-lata services.
Local access and usage are switched telephone services
provided by the local exchange company to its residential
and business end users.

Long distance access is the

switched service provide by the local exchange telephone
company to the Long Distance Companies.

The local company

connects the end user to the long distance circuits.
Special services are those non-switched dedicated circuit
services provided by either the long distance or local
telephone companies.

Local access is viewed as a fixed cost

service and local usage is a variable cost service based on
distance and duration of calls.

6Crew, 120-134.

Inter-lata long distance

10

services and long distance access are considered variable
cost services.

Special Services are fixed cost services.

Given these varied amounts of services, regulation has
created opportunities for gains by intervention of various
agents.

This is termed rent seeking.

These rent seekers

can be insiders within the telecommunications industry,
employees of the firms, the regulatory commissions,
outsiders, competitors, regulators, attorneys and lobbyists.
The effects of this rent seeking activity are hidden from
the regulatory process.7
Some of the movements that are experienced in the
regulatory process are caused by rent seekers who desire to
preserve their position or gain an advantage to their
present rent seeking position.

The interests of the various

rent seekers in the regulatory process cause the politics of
public utility regulation.
Regulation is not a precise science.

The regulatory

process reaches settlements by gaining concurrence between
the regulating agencies, the regulated firms and other
interested parties.8

Resolutions are normally made by

compromised stipulations.

There is an opportunity in the

7Crew, 263-268.
8Robert Britt Horwitz, The Ironv of Regulatory Reform: the
Deregulation of American Telecommunications. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 124.-126.

regulatory process to deviate from the cost subadditivity
precepts of a natural monopoly.
The next section, in the literary review, considers the
regulatory commissions and the arduous task that regulatory
agencies face.
Regulatory commissions are in a difficult position.
Suspicious consumers view them as being captives of the
firms that they are required to regulate.9

Commissions are

viewed by the regulated firms as a road-block to their
ability to provide efficient services.

The firms are ever

resistant to the suggestions of micro-managing for the
purposes of establishing precise costing information for the
purposes of the regulatory process.

Given the shortcomings

of the rate of return regulation, incentive measures have
been suggested to be employed by the regulatory
commissions.10

There is no clear consensus if those

incentives should reward shareholders, managers or
consumers.11

The regulatory commissions appear to have no

clear mandate or vehicle to address the regulatory problems.

9Barry M. Mitnick,
The Political Economy of Regulation:
Creating. Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 93-94.
10Kurt A. Strasser,
Regulating Utilities with Management
Incentives. (New York: Quorum Books, 1989), 1.
^Strasser,

106.

12

To understand the market of the telecommunications
industry, a review of the next section discusses
telecommunication history.
Curiously enough, the telecommunications industry was
not born as a monopoly in the late 1800's.

There were

multiple telephone companies serving the same major market
areas within the country.

In 1907, American Bell company

only commanded 49% of the market place.

With the American

Bell organization only making 8% on return in 1906, the
company fell into the hands of the bankers of the J.P.
Morgan, who reorganized it to American Telephone and
Telegraph.

Theodore Vail became the new Chairman of AT&T.

He established a strategy to gain control of the available
technology and accommodate any regulatory pressure on the
telecommunication industry.

Vail agreed to submit to price,

service and rate return regulation.

In return, Vail

expected entry restrictions in the telecommunications
industry and a guarantee of a fair rate of return.12
Throughout the history of the telecommunication
industries, competitive challenges were continually made on
the fringe markets of the industry.

The telecommunications

industry natural monopoly status has been repeatedly tested
as technology presents new opportunities.

The tests have

12Gerald R. Faulhaber,
Telecommunications in Turmoil:
Technology and Public Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub. Co.,
1987), 2.

come from the development of private point to point radio
systems, private telephone switching equipment and private
fiber optic systems.
The next section cites the telecommunication policy
issues that have been continuing throughout the regulatory
process.

Because of the fragmented nature of policy

decisions in the United States regulatory environment,
telecommunication policy has not necessarily been a
consistent and standard thread through our economic history.
The initial telecommunication policy, articulated by the
Communications Act of 1934, was a provision of universal
service for the country.13

Since the late 1980's, more than

95% of all households in the country have telecommunication
service^.
met.

The universal service goal has virtually been

The major policy issue for the country has changed.

The new challenge will be to determine the best way
telecommunication services can be provided for the future.
The issues that I have highlighted are as follows:
1)Inter-service cost subsidies complicate the natural
monopoly precept of lowest cost for services in the
multiproduct telecommunications industry.

The lack of price

sustainability of some services has allowed competitive
entry, because of cross-subsidies.

2)Rate design has been

the area of discussion about the solutions to price
13Walter G. Bolter et al., Telecommunications Policy for the
1990s and Bevond (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 81.

sustainability.

3)Telephone firms and other rent seekers

have moved to benefit from the regulatory process.
The tough job of the imprecise regulatory process is
seeking concurrence.
incentive programs.

The process has evolved to an era of
These incentive programs, like

telephone regulations, have been fragmented because of the
many regulatory jurisdictions in this country.

These issues

serve as a platform to outline the model for this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL MODEL
How responsive is telephone management to regulatory
reform?

Is there planning or implementation lags in their

responses, or are their immediate actions that are evident?
The management of a regulated telephone company deals with
many constraints.

Besides the typical business constraints,

the regulatory constraint is a big factor to this industry.
The management of the telephone company is a very
complex endeavor.

Market factors, production factors,

financial factors and economic factors are examples of
influences on management.

To explore my issue, I will deal

with a small portion of the influences on the industry.
Federal Communication Commission Policy is a common
regulatory factor with the twelve largest telephone
companies.

Telephone companies have state regulations that

are important influences as well.

The most desirable study

would be to look at each company's action, while considering
its unique state and federal regulatory environment.

Most

of the twelve largest telephone companies, representing 94%
of the local telephone service in the country, serve in
multiple states.

Unfortunately, only expense data is

available for the individual states, not employee data.
15

Of

16

the expense data available, some of the expense is direct
and some is allocated from sister operations and/or parent
operations.

Individual state data poses a problem of

questionable usability.
Since I was unable to find company employee detail by
state, each company was contacted to request the
information.

Most refused to supply the information because

it was considered proprietary.

For the companies that were

willing to work with me, confusion developed on how to
apportion shared employee resources.

Restructuring and

reorganization between the states during the period of study
also contributed to this quandary.

This search for viable

data revealed that the best data would be company wide data,
that is publicly reported with consistent meaning through
the study period.
The behavior of the telecommunications manager is our
focus.

The profit optimizing manager would choose a course

of action based on the regulatory constraints at the time.
Even though the regulatory process desires to move the firm
to a competitive marginal cost for the pricing of regulated
services, there remains managerial discretion in the
expenses of an operation.

The amount of managerial

discretion, due to imprecise information, is not available
for review in the regulatory process.

The existence of this

discretionary margin may be shown, if management improves
efficiency at some trigger point independent of any

17

technology or system improvements.

Technology and system

improvements take preparation and lead time that would lag
any one trigger point.

Personnel levels would be a resource

that could be readily adjusted.

A review of the total

company data and federal regulatory reform would be
appropriate to test for discretionary margin.
The theoretical model for this study is a review of the
rate of growth of local exchange telecommunication
companies7 output efficiencies.

With the divestiture of the

regional Bell operating companies from AT&T in 1984, data
became available for the individual local exchange telephone
companies.
There are three market sectors to the local telephone
company:

1)business services

3)access services.

2)residential services

Access services are those services

provided to the long distance telephone companies that
connect to them.

They provide access to the local business

and residential customers by way of that connection.
Since 1985, operations information is available for the
regional Bell operating companies and the other independent
telephone companies.

The employees, divided by the number

of telephone service lines in billing, will be used as a
measure of efficiency.

The resulting index would be

analyzed over the time period from 1985 to 1991.

Over that

period, the rate of change in efficiency will be analyzed to
determine if any impacts of the various regulatory actions

in the industry occurred.

The theoretical model can be

expressed as follows:

Employees/Access Line = Company-j^i * YdummyS * ePTrend #

The Company variable is set to a value of e at the
observation of the company in question, or 1 if not.
The Ydummy variable is set to a value of e if it is
year of regulatory action, or 1 if not.

To test the one

year effect, the dummy variable is triggered on for the
represented year and then triggered off for all other years.
To determine lasting effect the dummy variable is triggered
on and left on after the represented year.
Along with the review of the local exchange telephone
companies, the index of output per hour for all employees is
analyzed.

The index represents the total telephone industry

for the 1980's, using 1977 as a base index of 100.

The

theoretical model can be expressed as follows:

Index = a * Ydummy^ * ePTrenc* .

In chapter 4 all parameters are discussed, as linear
transformations are done for estimation purposes.
To assess the model the following assumptions of
telecommunications industry are provided.

During the

1980's, there were no extraordinary changes in

telecommunication technologies.

Digital switching

technologies were introduced in the late 1970's.

Fiber

optic technology was delivered in the early 1980's.
A gradual improvement trend was pervasive in the
1980's.

Administrative system efficiencies experienced

steady, but no dramatic improvements in any particular year
during this period.

It was appropriate to expect that the

growth rate in efficiency would be stable through the
1980's .
The two major regulatory activities that occurred in
telecommunications in the 1980's, would be long distance
service deregulation and price cap regulation.

CHAPTER 4

THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
To give the reader an appreciation of the data that
have been collected, the following is presented for review.
These data show the improvement that has been experienced in
employees per access line for the average local telephone
company and various telecommunications companies that were
reviewed.

It should be noted that an improvement in this

context is a decline in employees per access line.
objective is a lower number of employees.
are a proxy for cost.

The

The employee data

With reduced employees come reduced

cost.
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This graph presents the average company efficiency.

It

would be helpful to look at the variety of results by
company.

The following three graphs depict the individual

company indexes.
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The output per hour for all employees of the total
telecommunication industry was also considered.

The

following graph will show the trend during that period.
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Figure 5 Telephone Communications Indexes of Output per
Hour for All Employees 1980-1988 (From Statistical Abstract
of the U.S., 1980-1989)
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The theoretical model expressed in chapter 3 is
transformed into a linear form by taking the natural
logarithm for the purpose of estimation.

The basic linear

equation for the model would be:

Ln(Employees/Access Line) =
Ln(a) + (3Trend + 5Ln(Ydummy) + Y^Ln(Co^) + e-j^

To test the significance of regulatory activity in the
industry, dummy variables will be assigned for those years
of the implemented regulatory change.

Because of the linear

transformation, the dummy variables are set on with a value
of 1 and set off with a value of 0.

In this model, P

(beta), the coefficient of the Trend Variable, would be the
growth rate of the index (Employees/Access Line).
improving growth rate would be a negative value.

An
The

coefficient 8 (delta), represents the deviation from the
growth rate of the index for the year specified.

The

variables significantly different from zero, would be
required to show a correlation in timing for the year with
regulatory action and a significant change in rate of growth
in efficiency.

The coefficient a (alpha) is the intercept

and the fixed effect for the omitted company dummy variable.
The coefficient y (gamma) is a shift of the intercept for a
specified company.

To substantiate the local telephone company findings, a
rate of change of output efficiency model for the
telecommunications industry has been analyzed for the
1980's.

The index of output per hour for all employees for

telephone communications was studied.

The source for this

data was The Statistical Abstract of the U . S .

The

theoretical model is transformed into a linear form by
taking the natural logarithm for estimation as follows:

Ln( Index) = Ln(a) + (3Trend + 8Ln(Ydummy) + et

As in the pervious model, a dummy variable, for those years
where regulatory changes were affected, was utilized .

In

this model an improving growth rate would be a positive
number for the trend coefficient.

The coefficients would

have the same meaning as in the first model.

Chapter 5

Results
The null hypothesis for this thesis is as follows: A
significant increase in efficiency should not be expected
once alternative rate regulation for interexchange services
was imposed, in 1991, on the local telephone companies.
Price Caps, or alternate rate regulation, was announced
to be effective January 1, 1991, for the local exchange
companies.

A regression of the trend in improvement showed

an annual 6% rate of growth in efficiency improvement, for
the study period of 1985 through 1991.

The following Table

of the regression output is offered for review.
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Table 1 Least Squares Regression with Dependent Variable of
Logarithm(Employees/Access Line)
Number of observations: 84
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

-4.9830287
Constant
Trend Variable -0.0596905
ALLTEL
0.0619553
Ameritech
-0.1774234
Bell Atlantic -0.2653469
0.0054549
Bell South
GENTEL
0.1619602
NYNEX
-0.0555081
-0.0859299
Pac Telesis
0.2068086
SNET
Southwestern -0.0854026
-0.1107413
U.S. West
0.0183727
United
Year 1991
0.0190404
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.928305
0.914 990
0.052445
136.0972
2.238176

STD. ERROR

T-STAT.

0.0236397
0.0036191
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0280333
0.0206848

-210.79052
-16.493299
2.2100647
-6.3290327
-9.4654332
0.1945885
5.7774302
-1.9800815
-3.0652854
7.3772600
-3.0464751
-3.9503533
0.6553884
0.9205034

2-TAIL SIG
0.0000
0.0000
0.0304
0.0000
0.0000
0.8463
0.0000
0.0516
0.0031
0.0000
0.0033
0.0002
0.5144
0.3605

Mean of dependent var •
-5.246221
S.D. of dependent var 0.179876
0.192537
Sum of squared resid
F-statistic
69.71975
Prob(F-statistic)
0.000000

This table indicates the year of 1991 did not show any
significant change in that trend.

Accordingly, the null

hypothesis would have to be accepted.

In 1991, the

institution of price cap regulation for the local exchange
companies on their inter-exchange services, did not have a
significant impact on the rate of growth in efficiency
improvements.
Pooled cross-sectional and time series data used in
this regression required an additional test to insure that
serial correlation was not brought about in the shifts to a

different company's data.

The residuals of the initial

regression were regressed against the lagged residuals
excluding the year 1985 for each company.

No significant

relationship was shown between the residuals and lagged
residuals.

This additional test confirms no evidence of

serial correlation in my analysis.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSIONS
The null hypothesis is accepted.

No significant

impact, due to the instituting of local exchange price cap
regulations on interexchange services, is apparent in 1991.
The data suggests that there was an impact,

(using a 1 Tail

Test) in the years of 1986-1987, on the rate of growth in
efficiencies.
Table 2 Least Squares Regression with Dependent Variable of
Logarithm(Employees/Access Line)
Number of observations: 84
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

-4.9698129
Constant
Trend Variable -0.0604489
0.0619553
ALLTEL
Ameritech
-0.1774234
Bell Atlantic -0.2653469
0.0054549
Bell South
0.1619602
GENTEL
NYNEX
-0.0555081
-0.0859299
Pac Telesis
SNET
0.2068086
Southwestern -0.0854026
U.S. West
-0.1107413
United
0.0183727
Year 1986-1987 -0.0261182
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.930812
0.917963
0.051520
137.5921
2.209982

STD. ERROR
0.0246480
0.0031927
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0275388
0.0141347

T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG
-201.63165
-18.933462
2.2497481
-6.4426752
-9.6353921
0.1980825
5.8811682
-2.0156354
-3.1203249
7.5097242
-3.1011769
-4.0212848
0.6671564
-1.8478099

0.0000
0.0000
0.0276
0.0000
0.0000
0.8436
0.0000
0.0477
0.0026
0.0000
0.0028
0.0001
0.5069
0.0689

Mean of dependent var -5.246221
S.D. of dependent var 0.179876
0.185804
Sum of squared resid
72.44107
F-statistic
0.000000
Prob(F-statistic)
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In this regression, the year dummy variable was set on
for 1986 and 1987.

The results for years 1986 and 1987,

individually, were not significant.

Why would regression

results show evidence of response in 1986-1987 as opposed to
1991?

Alternate regulation changes do not happen in any one

particular period.

It takes a significant lead time for the

regulatory process to occur.
The reason for the lead time requirement becomes clear
with a discussion of the process.

Within the

Telecommunications Industry, trade associations announce
possible changes in alternatives for regulation.

The FCC

issues a notice of proposed rule making and asks for
responses.

After responses are received, proposed rules are

issued by the FCC.

Supplemental rules are announced as the

issues are considered within an industry.

Ultimately, an

order is issued by the Federal Communications Commission
citing the timing and what changes will be implemented.
In the case of Price Cap regulation, the National
Telecommunications and Information Agency issued a notice of
request for alternate rate regulation comments on October
10, 1986.

The objectives for this request where to

determine the effectiveness of rate of return regulation and
to discuss alternatives.

The alternatives were social

contracts, market basket concepts, band pricing and price
caps.

3.1

This request for comments was an opportunity for the
telecommunications industry to formalize the various plans
that had been circulating for alternate rate regulation.
The FCC sent out their notice of proposed rule making in
1987, with adaptations continuing through 1988.
Ultimately, the FCC adopted price caps for AT&T
effective July 1, 1989.

Further, it adopted price caps

regulation for local exchange companies for interstate
jurisdictions effective January 1, 1991.

The seeds were

sewn for price cap regulations in October, 1986.

This

suggested those telephone company managers, on the basis of
the inquiries initiated in 1986 and 1987, reacted
immediately.

They reacted on their expectations of what the

new regulation environment for the telecommunications
industry would be.
As verification, the regression results show that in
the period of 1986 and 1987, there was a significant
increase in rate of change of approximately 3%.

These

results suggest management discretion was exercised by local
exchange telecommunication executives.

They anticipated

that their price cap scheme would be accepted.

They would

have every motivation to reduce expenses as quickly as
possible, so as to optimize their income potential.

At some

point, the benefits of improving efficiency would be
experienced by incentive price cap regulation.

Apparently

not all changes where effected in the last two months of
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1986.

Some improvements in growth rates continued on in

1987.
Regressions where run to determine if any other time
periods showed significant impact on efficiency.
found.

None were

Additionally, the year dummy variables where set on

for a specific year; plus, all subsequent years to test for
lasting effect.

No significant lasting effects were

evident.
To contrast these findings, efficiency data were
accumulated for the total Telecommunications industry for
the 1980's.

This data included the entire industry, long

distance as well as local exchange companies.

To verify the

experience in the local exchange telephone companies, an
additional regression was run on the indices.
Table 3 Least Square Regression with Dependent Variable of
Logarithm(Index of Output per Man-hour)
Number of observations; 9
VARIABLE
Constant
Trend Variable
Year 1983
Year 1986

COEFFICIENT

STD. ERROR

4.2816453
0.0487702
0.0617658
0.0212980

0.0087159
0.0006165
0.0049101
0.0050572

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.999278
0.998845
0.004566
38.37599
2.095110

T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG
491.24661
79.104811
12.579248
4.2113887

Mean of dependent var
S.D. of dependent var
Sum of squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0084
4.973657
0.134373
0.000104
2307.498
0.000000

This regression shows, with significance, an improvement in
the growth rate of the output index in 1983 and 1986.
1986?

Why

In 1986, the intent for alternate rate of regulation

consideration for price caps was announced.

The industry

timing results did not precisely match the local exchange
company results because of the influence of AT&T in the
data.

The initial price cap discussions where directed at

AT&T.

AT&T responded in late 1986.

The local exchange

companies reacted in late 1986 through 1987.
The reaction evident in 1983, is due to the
telecommunications industry preparation for the deregulation
of the long distance telephone service.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

On the basis of this analysis, telecommunication
managers respond to regulatory reforms.

In addition to long

term improvements made available by changing technologies,
short run improvements can be opted for by management.

The

amount of improvement may be controlled by management, based
on the reforms initiated.

Telecommunication management

responds with rational expectation.

They do not wait for

rule or policy changes.
In the present incentive regulatory scheme the lowest
cost for services is not assured.

The discretionary margins

are evident but this analysis does not show that all margins
have been reduced.

The resolution of problems caused by

cross subsidies and rate design imperfections, may not
provide price sustainability.

If solutions in rate design

are found with out reducing discretionary margins to
competitive levels, price sustainability will not be
attained.

The issues of management discretion on operating

choices seem to be fertile ground for consideration of
telecommunication industry improvements in competitive price
sustainability.
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Additionally, the clarifying of which rent seeker is
benefiting from regulatory efforts, would help provide
information about improvements that can be made in the
regulatory process.
Hopefully evidence presented in this study can point
the way for additional improvements in the telecommunication
industry.

APPENDIX I

DATA UTILIZED FOR REGRESSIONS
OBSERVATION ACCESS
LINES

EMPLOYEES

EMPLOYEES PER
ACCESS LINES

ALLTEL
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

905200.0
953943.0
982996.0
1084283 .
1123590.
1157105.
1210864.

5968.000
5876.000
5695.000
7532.000
5887.000
5899.000
5822.000

0.006593
0.006160
0.005794
0.006947
0.005239
0.005098
0.004808

Ameritech
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

14555000
14755000
15094000
15469000
15899000
16278000
16584000

74094.00
71170.00
71871.00
67783.00
71419.00
69430.00
66390.00

0.005091
0.004823
0.004762
0.004382
0.004492
0.004265
0.004003

Atlantic
lell ,
15090000
1985
15508973
1986
16056907
1987
16541000
1988
17056802
1989
17484000
1990
17750000
1991

77750.00
70768.00
71260.00
65815.00
67197.00
62050.00
64922.00

0.005152
0.004563
0.004438
0.003979
0.003940
0.003549
0.003658

Jell South
14532000
1985
15045900
1986
15739470
1987
16407000
1988
16720367
1989
17721560
1990
17614736
1991

91384.00
96886.00
85540.00
100280.0
77624.00
85960.00
82200.00

0.006288
0.006439
0.005435
0.006112
0.004642
0.004851
0.004667
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OBSERVATION ACCESS
LINES

EMPLOYEES

EMPLOYEES PER
ACCESS LINES

Centel
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1299300.
1354317.
1422969.
1503192.
1590716.
1670135.
1593406.

8598.000
8109.000
7837.000
7768.000
7886.000
8265.000
7834.000

0.006617
0.005988
0.005507
0.005168
0.004958
0.004949
0.004917

Gen Tel
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

12721200
13408250
13937373
14650000
14891090
15183743
15632000

102763 .0
98376.00
96623.00
90152.00
87990.00
85316.00
78700.00

0.008078
0.007337
0.006933
0.006154
0.005909
0.005619
0.005035

NYNEX
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

13623000
13962255
16046014
14851000
14960953
15511119
15409521

94900.00
76000.00
78890.00
76900.00
73222.00
71970.00
64852.00

0.006966
0.005443
0.004916
0.005178
0.004894
0.004640
0.004209

Pacific Telesis
1985
11692000
1986
12068564
1987
12525000
13093000
1988
14202949
1989
1990
14558033
1991
14262000

71000.00
70711.00
67770.00
63618.00
65057.00
61760.00
58485.00

0.006073
0.005859
0.005411
0.004859
0.004581
0.004242
0.004101

Southern New England Tel
13500.00
1985
1674000.
13155.00
1711533.
1986
12972.00
1987
1779204.
12533.00
1839000.
1988
11339.00
1989
1875000.
11001.00
1904000.
1990
10147.00
1887000.
1991

0.008065
0.007686
0.007291
0.006815
0.006047
0.005778
0.005377
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OBSERVATION ACCESS
LINES

EMPLOYEES

EMPLOYEES
ACCESS l i :

Southwestern Bell
1985
10880000
1986
11772089
1987
11104974
1988
11340449
1989
11444061
1990
12562533
1991
12934679

62000.00
61774.00
59620.00
57970.00
58400.00
52864.00
54923.00

0.005699
0.005247
0.005369
0.005112
0.005103
0.004208
0.004246

U.S. West
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

11195000
11332000
11613000
11878000
12306536
12562533
12934679

66538.00
59221.00
57463.00
56749.00
58778.00
52860.00
54923.00

0.005944
0.005226
0.004948
0.004778
0.004776
0.004208
0.004246

United
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

3256800.
3381332.
3516814.
3685337.
3811980.
3946812.
4083205.

21913.00
20221.00
20427.00
19594.00
20115.00
19593.00
19411.00

0.006728
0.005980
0.005808
0.005317
0.005277
0.004964
0.004754

Observations

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Index of
Output per
Hour for
all
Employees
1977 = 100
118.1000
124.4000
129.1000
145.1000
143.0000
149.8000
161.3000
165.9000
176.7000
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